THE IMPACT OF NON-KINETIC, SOFT-POWER WARFARE AND THE FIGHT AGAINST INSURGENCY IN THE NORTH-EAST OF NIGERIA:A CASE OF OPERATION SAFE CORRIDOR PROGRAMME, (DRR) 2015-2020
Abstract
This research paper explores the significant impact of non-kinetic, soft-power warfare strategies in the context of counter insurgency efforts in the North-East region of Nigeria, with a specific focus on the Operation Safe Corridor Programme spanning from 2015 to 2020. The study delves into the multifaceted dimensions of counterinsurgency, with a primary emphasis on the Disarmament, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DRR) framework. Through a comprehensive analysis of both secondary and primary data sources, including historical records, interviews, and program evaluations, this research sheds light on the transformative potential of non-violent approaches in mitigating the insurgency crisis.The findings reveal that the Operation Safe Corridor Programme has played a pivotal role in reducing violence, promoting sustainable peace, and fostering community resilience in the North-Eastern region. This paper underscores the importance of nuanced, context-specific strategies that prioritize deradicalization and rehabilitation, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. Furthermore, it highlights the necessity of long-term planning and the tailor-made design of deradicalization methods to address the root causes of insurgency effectively.In conclusion, this research offers valuable insights into the pragmatic application of soft-power warfare in countering insurgency, advocating for the integration of non-kinetic strategies as essential components of comprehensive security measures. It reinforces the notion that addressing the underlying drivers of radicalization through programs like Operation Safe Corridor is indispensable for lasting peace and stability in conflict-affected regions.
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