

ORGANIZED CRIME KIDNAPPING AND NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract

The study is necessitated by the need to situate the crisis in Nigeria, The violence has taken terror dimensions. Such violent agitations have claimed thousands of lives, other thousands displaced and inestimable properties have been destroyed rendering the region one of the most dangerous zones to live in Nigeria today. The research looked at the genesis of the crisis, the threats it poses to human and national security and the policies that have been adopted by the Nigerian state to curtail and control the crisis. A total of 200 questionnaires were distributed among the respondents identified for the study within the FCT. The study shows that the genesis of the terrorism, kidnapping and hostage taking going on in the Niger Delta region was caused by poverty, unemployment and long years of economic deprivation. Also respondent believe the government has the political will and ability to resolve the issue and that the establishment of the NDDC, Niger Delta development Master Plan and the Amnesty programme offered the militant will help tackle the insecurity in the Niger Delta. Respondents are also of the opinion that JTF has performed very well in tackling the terrorism going on there. We then concluded that government should continue to pursue the development and reclamation of degraded land in the Niger Delta region due to oil exploration and address the grievances of the region.

Introduction

Nigeria is a state under perpetual internal security threat from various ethno-religious militias or political insurgents. At a more general level the threat has social, economic, political and environmental dimensions. Each of these dimensions, singly and conjointly, greatly affects the nation's stability and well-being. Threats to human and national security ranges from the menace of separatist demands, illegal militia armies, ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorism, armed robbery, corruption and poverty to sabotage of public properties, economic sabotage and environmental degradation. (Praeger; Newyork, 1990.) While it is conceded that oil has generated massive revenue for the country, it must be noted that, the negative effects from the exploration and production of oil and gas from the region, have continued to affect the people adversely .The deleterious impact has resulted in an extensive pollution, ecological fragmentation and alteration, as well as socio-economic and political marginalization. So much has been written on the environmental crisis in the region that it should not delay us here.(Praeger; Newyork, 1990.)

Suffice it to say that, what the people of this region get by way of compensation from the federal Government does not seem to correlate with the stupendous revenue that is garnered from it. Revenue from this region has fueled socio-economic and political transformation of other geopolitical zones in Nigeria. Expectedly, in time perspective, the people of this region realized that to remain mute in the face of such huge ecological destruction was unwise. It would appear that it is the realization of the need to protect themselves from activities of oil firms and, a government so keen on extracting surplus from their region without considering their interest that series of anti-oil protests have occurred in the region which has resulted to taking arms against the federal government and the multinational oil firms. Thus, this study is necessitated by need to situate the protest in the region in historical perspective. In doing this, an analysis of the causes of the protests is undertaken. In line with this, what appears to be Federal Government's response to these protests are highlighted and discussed.

Among these, ethno-religious fighting and violent attacks in the oil-rich Niger Delta forms the major security dilemma. The predominant threats and security challenges in the area are emanating from un-abating attacks on oil installations, arm proliferation, sea piracy, youth restiveness, bunkering, kidnap and hostage taking. In the last three decades, the Niger Delta region, the centre of Nigeria's oil wealth has been the scene of protest, sometimes violent, against the repressive tendencies of the Nigerian state on the one hand and against the recklessness, exploitative and environmentally unfriendly activities of oil Multinationals on the other hand. Such violent agitations have claimed thousands of lives, other thousands displaced and inestimable properties have been destroyed. In economic term, millions of dollars have been lost to youth restiveness, disruption of production, pipeline vandalization, hostage-taking, assault and bombing of oil installations to mention a few. The use of terror strategies by the agitated groups to end the real and perceived injustices has attracted global attentions and a rethink on resource distribution policies of the Federal government. However, the persistence of the problem suggests the failure of such policies. This paper examines the menace of domestic terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and its security implications.

Statement of problem

The terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking witnessed in the Niger delta is an offspring of frustration and aggression due to repressive government policies, exploitative tendencies and insensitivity of the multinational oil companies operating in the region. The discovery of crude oil and gas brought joy and hope to the people of the Niger Deltans. This was because the people believed that the discovery would lead the region to sustainable development.

The Niger Deltans were confident that oil discovery in their region would mean access to basic amenities, such as potable water, steady electricity supply, functional healthcare facilities, good roads, good schools and employment opportunities. In their innocence, they believed that the Nigerian government and the multinational oil companies were

interested in bringing development to their rural communities to fight against the negative consequences associated with the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas. After 50 year of operation, all of these dreams seem to be a nightmare.

Their demands are simple: “give us a fair share from the revenue accruing from our resources and care for our environment”. But a deaf hear was turned by both Government and the multinational operating companies and all they did was to pay lip services. These cumulated to the immediate past and present crisis in the Niger Delta Region and thus encouraged the emergence of armed groups and insurgents who terrorized the region for decades. Some armed group shifted the genuine fight for socio-economic justice for their communities to mere selfish desires through criminal activity such as piracy, kidnapping, hostage-taking and oil theft or bunkering.

Research questions /Hypothesis

Research Questions

- a) What is the genesis of Niger Delta Militants Terrorist activities?
- b) Is Niger Delta Militants a terrorist group or freedom fighter?
- c) Is the emergence of Niger Delta Militants due to poverty, unemployment and long years of economic deprivation?
- d) What are the perceptions of Nigerians regarding the causes of Niger Delta Militants terrorist activities in Nigeria?
- e) What are the effects of Niger Delta Militants activities on the socio-economic and political life of Nigeria?
- f) What is the role of the government and security agencies in checking the menace?
- g) Do the security agencies have adequate personnel and gadgets to track and prosecute Niger Delta Militants insurgent?
- h) What is/are the socio-economic and political implications of Niger Delta Militants activities on the Nigerian economy, reputation and integrity to investors?

Hypothesis Formulation

The following hypotheses are to be tested in this research work as stated bellow:

Hypothesis One

H₀: Niger Delta Militants did not emerge as a freedom fighter but as a terrorist group.

H₁: Niger Delta Militants did emerge as a freedom fighter but as a terrorist group.

Hypothesis Two

H₀: The emergence of Niger Delta Militants activities in Nigeria is not due to the high level of poverty, unemployment and economic deprivation

H₁: The emergence of Niger Delta Militants activities in Nigeria is due to the high level of poverty, unemployment and economic deprivation

Hypothesis Three

- H₀:** The establishment of NDDC, Niger Delta Development Master Plan and the Amnesty programme are the only ways to address the terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking going on in the Niger Delta region
- H₁:** The establishment of NDDC, Niger Delta Development Master Plan and the Amnesty programme are the only ways to address the terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking going on in the Niger Delta region

Geo-political map of Niger Delta Region



RESEARCH PROCEDURE

The sampled respondents within the scope of this study will be administered randomly a total of 200 questionnaires. This will be proportionately distributed without any bias for age, sex, or religion. It will be distributed among adults age 18 and above who are able to understand what the study is all about and answer the questionnaire appropriately. The questionnaire will be distributed based on the following percentage allocations:

Respondents	Percentage Allocation	Total Questionnaire allocated
State Security Services	15	30
The Nigeria Police Force	15	30
Ex-militants	5	10
The Judiciary	5	10
Nigerian Army (Military)	15	30
Civil Defence Corps	15	30
Law Makers	10	20
General Public	20	40
Total	100	200


Table .1 Analysis of Questionnaire Response Rate

Respondents	Percentage Questionnaire Allocation	Nos. of Questionnaire allocated	Nos. Questionnaires Returned
State Security Services	15	30	30
The Nigeria Police Force	15	30	28
Ex-militants	10	20	19
The Judiciary	10	20	18
Nigerian Army (Military)	15	30	28
Civil Defence Corps	10	20	19
Lawmakers	10	20	18
General Public	15	30	30
Total	100	200	190

The table above shows that out of a total of 200 questionnaires distributed, 190 were returned, and this gives a total of 95% response from all the respondents. Therefore analyses and data presentation will be based only on the returned questionnaire.

Analysis Of Demographic Characteristics Of The Respondents


(1) Gender (sex)




N=190 respondents

The chart shows that 55% of the respondents were Male while the remaining 45% were Females.

(2). Age analysis






N=190 respondents


The analysis shows that 35% of the respondents have Tertiary education, 30% each respectively have Secondary and University education while only 5% has Primary education.

(4). Economic Status of respondents



N=190 respondents

(5) Ethnic origin of Respondents



N=190 respondents

The analysis shows that 36% of the respondents are from Hausa origin, 30% are Yorubas, 17% are Ibos, 11% are from other ethnic identity, while 6% refused to answer.


ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

The result of analysis of questionnaire bothering on assessing *Terrorism, Kidnapping and Hostage-taking in Nigeria: A case study of Niger Delta*, will be presented below:

Q1: Are you aware of the Terrorism, Kidnapping and Hostage-taking happening in the Niger Delta?

Table (Q1)

Options	Frequency	Percentage of Respondents
Yes	85	45
No	72	38
Don't know	33	17
Total	190	100




N=190 respondents

Analysis: The result of analysis of the question shows that 85(45%) of the respondents said Yes that they are aware of the Terrorism, Kidnapping and Hostage-taking in the Niger Delta, 72(38%) said No, that they are not aware, while the remaining 33(17%) were undecided in their opinion.

Q2: How would you classify the activities of Militants in the Niger Delta?

Table 4.2(Q2)

Classification	Frequency	Percentage
Ethnic Militias	57	30
Terrorist group	34	18
Political insurgents	23	12
Freedom fighters	61	32
All of the above	15	8
Total	190	100



N=190 respondents


Analysis: From the table above it can be seen that a total of 61(32%) respondents believe that Niger Delta Militants are *Freedom fighters*, 57(30%) respondents said they are *Ethnic militias* while 34(18%) believe that Niger Delta Militants are simply a Terrorist group.

Q3: The genesis of terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking going on in the Niger Delta has been adduced to the high level of poverty, unemployment and economic deprivation.....?

Table (Q3)

Options	Frequency	Percentage Respondents	of
I strongly agree	74	40	
I agree	35	18	
Neutral	13	7	
I disagree	37	19	
I strongly disagree	31	16	
Total	190	100	

N=192 respondents




Analysis: The chart above shows that about 109(58%) of the respondents cumulatively Agree that high level of *Poverty, Unemployment* and *economic deprivation* are the major reasons for the emergence of Militants engaging in terrorist, kidnapping and hostage-taking activities in the Niger Delta, while 68(35%) cumulative of them *Disagree* with the above notion.

Q4: How would you assess the performance of the NDDC in tackling the Niger Delta development agitations so far?

Table (Q4). Measuring performance of NDDC

Options	Frequency	Percentage of respondents
Excellent	31	16
Good	45	24
Average	66	35
Poor	27	14
Very poor	21	11
Total	190	100



Analysis: The result show that 66(35%) respondents said that NDDC has performed above average since its establishment in addressing the Niger Delta development challenges, while 45(24%) said NDDC had performed good (details on the table above).

Q5: It has been suggested that the militants that engaged in terrorism, Kidnapping and Hostage-taking in the Niger Delta should be treated as “terrorists” rather than being coloured as ethnic militia/freedom fighters?

Table (Q5)

Options	Frequency	Percentage of Respondents
Yes, I agree	68	36
No, I disagree	96	50
I Don't know	26	14
Total	190	100


N=190 respondents

Analysis: The analysis of responses to the above questions shows that 96(50%) of the respondents *Disagree* with the notion that the government should treat the Niger Delta militants as Terrorist and not freedom fighters, 68(36%) of the *Agree* with the notion, while 26(14%) said they *Don't know*.

Q6: How would you assess the performance of JTF security outfit in tackling the menace of the Militants operating in Niger Delta?

Table (Q6):

Options	Frequency	Percentage of Respondents
Very Satisfactory	53	28
Satisfactory	46	24
Neutral	9	5
Unsatisfactory	45	24
Very Unsatisfactory	37	19
Total	190	100



N=190 respondents


Analysis: The result from the analysis above shows that a cumulative 99(52%) respondents said *JTF* has performed Very Satisfactorily, while a cumulative 82(43%) said *JTF* has performed Unsatisfactorily in tackling the menace of terrorism, kidnapping and Hostage-taking being perpetrated by the militants in Niger Delta.

Q7: Kindly assess the implementation of the Amnesty programme offered the militants since 2009?

Table (Q7)

Options	Frequency	Percentage of Respondents
Very Satisfactory	35	18
Satisfactory	58	31
Neutral	17	9
Unsatisfactory	42	22
Very Unsatisfactory	38	20
Total	190	100

N=190 respondents



N=190 respondents


Analysis: The result from the table and chart above shows that a cumulative total of 93(49%) respondents were *Satisfied* with the implementation of the Amnesty programme offered the Niger Delta militants so far, while also a cumulative total of 80(42%) said they were *Unsatisfied* with the implementation of the Amnesty programme offered the Niger Delta Militants.

Q8: Do you think the government has the political will and capability to stamp out terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking by Niger Delta Militants?

Table (Q8)

Options	Frequency	Percentage of Respondents
Yes	98	52
No	87	46
Don't know	5	2
Total	190	100

N=190 respondents



Analysis: The result from the table above shows that 98(52%) of the respondents said *YES*, that the government has the political will and capability to stamp out terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking in Niger Delta region, 87(46%) respondents said, *NO* that the government does not have the political will and capability to stamp out terrorism,


kidnapping and hostage-taking in Niger Delta region, while five respondents amounting to two percent were undecided in their opinion.

Q9: From your own perspective, do you think the agitation for resource control being canvassed by the Niger Delta militant will end Terrorism, Kidnapping and Hostage-taking in the Niger Delta?

Table (Q9)

Options	Frequency	Percentage of Respondents
Yes, I agree	78	41
No, I disagree	92	48
Don't know	20	11
Total	190	100

N=190 respondent




Analysis: The result of the analysis shows that 78(41%) of respondents said *Yes*, that, the agitation for resource control will end the spate of terrorism, kidnapping and hostage taking going on in the Niger Delta, 92(48%) said *No*, that the agitation will not end the terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking being perpetrated in the Niger Delta, while 20(11%) were undecided in their opinion.

Q10: Will the establishment of NDDC, Niger Delta Development Master Plan and the Amnesty programme the best ways to address the terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking going on in the Niger Delta region?

Table (Q10)

Options	Frequency	Percentage of Respondents
Yes, I agree	96	51
No, I disagree	63	33
Don't know	31	16
Total	190	100



N=190 respondents

Analysis: The result from the analysis above shows that 96(51%) respondents said they agree the measures are the best ways to end terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking in the Niger Delta, while 63(33%) said No that they don't think the measure are the best, while 31(16%) respondents were undecided in their opinion.

Test of Hypothesis

The three Hypotheses formulated for this study earlier will now be tested whether it agrees or disagrees with the outcome of the analysis done above. The following hypotheses are to be tested in this research work using the analysis from the corresponding questions to test their validity:

Hypothesis One

H₀: Niger Delta Militants did not emerge as a freedom fighter but as a terrorist group.

H₁: Niger Delta Militants did emerge as a freedom fighter but as a terrorist group.

**Data Presentation and Interpretation: From Question2
Chi Square Table 4.2.1**

X	f	f'	(f-f')	(f-f') ²	$\chi^2 = (f-f')/f'$
Ethnic Militias	57	38	+19	361	9.5
Terrorist group	34	38	-4	16	0.42
Political insurgents	23	38	-15	225	5.92
Freedom fighters	61	38	+23	529	13.92
All of the above	15	38	-23	529	13.92
Total	190	190			43.68

Chi-Square Analysis

X^2 value = 43.68, Degree of freedom = 5 - 1 = 4

X^2 at 4 d.f and α @ .95 = 9.488

Decision: We reject Ho if X^2 (actual) is greater than X^2 (theoretical)

Conclusion: From the analysis above, **43.68 > 9.488**, meaning that the difference between the actual and the theoretical distribution is significant and not due to chance.

We therefore reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative the Niger Delta Militants did emerge as a freedom fighter but not as a terrorist group.

Hypothesis Two

H₀: The emergence of Niger Delta Militants activities in Nigeria is not due to the high level of poverty, unemployment and economic deprivation

H₁: The emergence of Niger Delta Militants activities in Nigeria is due to the high level of poverty, unemployment and economic deprivation

Data Presentation and Interpretation: From Question 3

Chi Square table 2

X	F	f'	f-f'	(f-f') ²	$\chi^2 = (f-f')/f'$
I strongly agree	74	38	36	1296	34.1
I agree	35	38	-3	9	0.24
Neutral	13	38	-25	625	16.4
I disagree	37	38	-1	1	0.03
I strongly disagree	31	38	-7	49	1.29
Total	190	190			52.06

N=190 respondents

Chi-Square Analysis

X^2 value = 52.06; Degree of freedom = 5 - 1 = 4

X^2 at 4 d.f and $\alpha @ .95 = 9.488$

Decision: We reject H_0 if $X^2(\text{actual})$ is greater than $X^2(\text{theoretical})$

Conclusion: From the analysis above, **52.06 > 9.488**, meaning that the difference between the actual and the theoretical distribution is significant and not due to chance. We therefore reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that the emergence of Niger Delta Militants violent activities in Nigeria is due to the high level of poverty, unemployment and economic deprivation.

Hypothesis Three

H₀: The establishment of NDDC, Niger Delta Development Master Plan and the Amnesty programme are the best ways to address the terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking going on in the Niger Delta region

H₁: The establishment of NDDC, Niger Delta Development Master Plan and the Amnesty programme are the only best ways to address the terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking going on in the Niger Delta region

Data Presentation and Interpretation: From Question 10

Chi Square Table 3

X	f	f^e	f-f^e	(f-f^e)²	χ² = (f-f^e)/f^e
Yes, I agree	96	63.3	32.7	1069.29	16.89
No, I disagree	63	63.3	-0.3	0.09	0.001
Don't know	31	63.3	-32.3	1043.29	16.48
Total	190				33.37
<i>N=190 respondents</i>					

Chi-Square Analysis:

*X²value = 33.37; Degree of freedom = 3 - 1 = 2
X² at 2 d.f. and α @ 0.95 = 5.991*

Decision: We reject Ho if X²(actual) is greater than X²(theoretical)

Conclusion: From the analysis above, **33.37 991** meaning that the difference between the actual and the theoretical distribution is significant and not due to chance. We therefore reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that the establishment of NDDC, Niger Delta Development Master Plan and the Amnesty Programme are the only best ways to address the terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking going on in the Niger Delta region.

This test agrees with the response of 96(51%) of the respondents, who said yes that establishment of NDDC, Niger Delta Development Master Plan and the Amnesty Programme are the only best ways to address the terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking going on in the Niger Delta region.

Conclusion

As it has been observed in this study, terrorism, kidnapping and hostage-taking in the Niger Delta region is a consequence of the long years of negligence, real and perceived marginalization of the oil producing communities and the nonchalant attitude of the oil companies to environmental safety. It is directed at the Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies rather than against the national interest of any nation. Therefore, the Niger Delta question in Nigeria is peculiar and domestic though it may have international implications. From all sides of the divide, it calls for a careful understanding of the issues involved, and the strategies being applied. The problem is for the Federal government to solve. Repressive state policies or military solution cannot be the right panacea but a determined effort, devoid of rhetoric, to promote social justice and equity; to stem the tide of environmental devastation and ecological destruction going on in the Niger Delta.

Though the establishments of special commission like the defunct OMPADEC and the current NDCC is a welcome development, it is necessary for the government to monitor and constantly evaluate the activities of such agency in order to determine whether its stated achievement is commensurate with the fund released. This will further check financial recklessness, mismanagement and corruption that have bedeviled all government agencies in the country. Most of the redistributive policies failed because they were conceived and adopted at a level far too removed from the people. Hence, there is need for community involvement in policies designed to affect their lives.

There is need for a clear and coherent national policy on terrorism, kidnapping and hostage taking. Akin to this, a well trained antiterrorism squad must be created from the Nigerian Army, Air Force, Navy, Police and State Security Service. The role of these security organizations must be clearly stated in order to prevent duplicity and conflict of functions. This is necessary and critical to Nigeria's preparedness to contain the development and spread of terror acts to other zones of the country.

Recommendations

While it is commendable the steps so far taken by the government to resolve the militancy in the Niger Delta region, notable of which is the amnesty programme and establishment of NDCC among other things, a lot still need to be done. Occasionally, soft measures are applied while at times hard measures are inevitable in order to maintain peace or protect the corporate existence of the country. Government should embark on the following policies to finally put to rest agitation in the Niger Delta region:

1. **Re-organizational policies** which refer to state effort to restructure or reconfigure political or administrative institutions and relationship in order to accommodate group demands or strengthen the efficacy of centralized state power.
2. **Regulatory policies** which on the other hand entail the mandatory imposition of sanctions or restrictions of individuals or groups that are perceived to pose a threat to state cohesion and order.
3. **Redistributive Policies:** Revenue sharing or resource distribution has been at the centre of ethnic agitation in Nigeria. The exceptional political sensitivity of resource allocation is worsened by the lack of consensus on the criteria of distribution, the absence of reliable socioeconomic data, and political change, and the extent to which revenue distribution is tied to perceptions of regional ethnic dominance (Suberu 2001). Revision in Federal revenue sharing arrangements have been the most important redistributive policies designed to contain ethnic minority agitation in Nigeria. The irony however is that, the various review exercises have been done at the disadvantage of the oil producing communities. Before oil assumes a prime position in the Nigerian economy derivation principle occupied the centre stage of revenue sharing practices. The percentage allocated to derivation stood at 50% before the promulgation of the Distributable Pool Account (DPA Decree 13 of 1970) which slashed it down to

45%. The 1979 Constitution revised the petroleum act of 1969 by declaring Federal Government's ownership of all mineral resources both onshore and offshore and the derivation share of oil revenue slashed to 5% by the Second Republic government of Shehu Shagari. Therefore government should revert back to 50% derivation formula before the promulgation of DPA Decree 13 of 1970, to enable the Niger Delta governments have more funds for developmental purposes.

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