

## THE IMPERATIVES OF PERSONALITY APPROACH IN THE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY IN NIGERIA

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### **Abstract**

*The role of personality in foreign policy analysis has received improved attentions in contemporary studies of foreign policy. Besides, the idiosyncrasy of a leader remains a fundamental factor among the determinants of foreign policy. Therefore, this study seeks to analyse the importance of personality approach in foreign policy analysis in Nigeria. Data for this study were obtained from secondary sources such as textbooks, journal articles and other secondary sources while content analysis was used to analyse the data collected. This study is situated within the psychoanalytic theory developed by Sigmund Freud. Moreover, this study admits that the role of the personality of decision makers in the analysis and promotion of foreign policy cannot be underestimated and remain relevant in understanding the direction of a nation foreign policy posture.*

**Keywords:** Foreign Policy, Personality, Decision, Ideas, State

### **INTRODUCTION**

Foreign policy deals with the relations between sovereign actors in the international system. Thus, foreign policy objectives can be understood as a range of intended actions as well as a set of strategies adapted by sovereign states with the purpose of influencing the behavior of other actors within the international system. These actors may be states, international organizations or any other actors classified as having acquired international personality or status such as, the Red Cross, PLO, the Paris Club and their likes.

Thus, foreign policy objectives can be understood as a course of action or set of principles adopted by states to determine or define their relationship with other international actors with the aim of influencing their behavior within the international system. Foreign policy as a set of objectives is that policy pursued by a nation in its dealings with other nations, designed to achieve national objectives.

Effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity of nation-state's place in the world, its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying assumptions are embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders interpret them and external and internal development reshape them. There seem to be agreement between many foreign policy practitioners and theoreticians that personality and identity are importance as a psychological frame of reference in international relations (Akindele, 2003).

The foreign policy of any country at any given time is intricately related to its domestic politics. It therefore, follows that a country's national power had direct relevance of its foreign policy. The country is big and relatively populous containing about one hundred and forty million people. Furthermore, Foreign policy behaviour includes intended and unintended actions and words of a government that influence its foreign policy (Smith, et al 2008). Therefore, any actions among the states such as agreements, aids, and alliances, use of force, political pressures, and actions in international relations are about foreign policy. These actions might be small or they mostly are taken with long-term goals in mind (Pearson et al 1998). It is against this background, this study seeks to analyse the importance of personality approach in foreign policy analysis using relevant examples.

### **Conceptual Review: Foreign Policy and Personality**

Foreign policy studies are part of international relations. Foreign is used to the policy towards the world outside the border of states (Beasley, et al 2013). Cooper (1972) argues that defining the notion of foreign policy could be difficult. Foreign policy could be described in the broader sense of the words as any contact between the citizens of different countries, but that is too-wide of a definition because it ignores the limitations the word 'policy' places on the term. The word 'policy' narrows down the meaning to the contacts between the governments. The term also could be understood in the wider sense, as 'a grand conception' of the world economic and political order that provide a grand framework for, and guidance to, the month-to-month decisions that nations must take in their relations with other nations (Cooper, 1972).

Russell et al (2006:134) defines foreign policy as "a guide to action taken beyond the boundaries of the State to further the goals of the State". In other words, Foreign Policy is the Policy of a State that is carried beyond her territorial boundaries in order to protect and promote its national interests. Northedges (1968:15) defines foreign policy simply as "Interplay between the outside and the inside". Professor Joseph Frankel on the other hand defines Foreign Policy as a "dynamic process of interaction between the changing domestic demand and supports and the changing external environments (Frankel 1975:9). In our opinion, Foreign Policy could also be understood as the general principles that govern a State's behaviour in the international system. It generally represents the actions and decisions of a State in its relationship with other States in the international system.

Reynolds (1995) mentions three definitions of foreign policy. The first definition is 'a range of actions taken by varying sections of the government of a state in its relations with other bodies similarly acting on the international stage, in order to advance the national interest'. In his second definition, he refers to foreign policy as a concept that 'consists of the external actions taken by decision-makers with the intention of achieving long range goals and short term objectives'. In the last definition Reynolds notes: 'Foreign policies are not made in a vacuum. They are made in relation to other bodies similarly acting in the global arena'.

Unlike Reynolds (1995), Lerche et al (1995) believe that there are two styles of foreign policy: the policy of status-quo and revisionism. A state that takes a policy of status-quo is generally satisfied with its position in the pattern of contemporary international relations. But despite its satisfaction taking a policy of status-quo does not mean that such is not open to changes within the boundaries of the structure of power. As long as the changes do not affect the stability of the state's position such as government is willing to embrace changes that gradually transform the nature of the relations in its favour.

On the contrary to the policy of status-quo, the policy of revisionism works against any stabilization. Such policy always creates crisis and disputes over controversial matters that help the state to establish the limits of the dispute and the boundaries of the struggle. In such situations if the dispute does not end-up in a war, it is the revisionist state that would have the upper hand in setting the timing as well. The crisis continues as long as the revisionist state wants it to continue, which means to the point that the state achieves its objectives. All this does not mean that the revisionist state is not open to proposals to create stability, but this only happens when the state sees an opportunity in it to change the situation to its own advantage, or when the stability helps it to achieve its strategic goals (Lerche et al 1995).

However, personality usually refers to that which is unique about a person; the characteristics that distinguish him from other people. Thought emotion, and behavior as such do not constitute a personality which is rather, the dispositions that underlie these elements. Personality implies predictability about how a person will act or react under different circumstances.

### **Theoretical Framework**

Scholars in international relations have developed a number of theories for the study of a nation's foreign policy such as Bureaucratic theory, Linkage Approach, Power Approach, Traditional/Classical Approach among others. This study is situated within the psychoanalytic theory developed by Sigmund Freud. Psychoanalytic theorists emphasize different aspects of personality and disagree about its origin,

development, and manifestation in behaviour. One of the most influential theoretical systems is the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud. Boeree (2006:1), a follower of Freud, holds that personality psychology is the study of the person, the whole human individual. He posits that in studying the personal psychology of person, biology, evolution and genetics, sensation and perception, motivation and emotion, learning and memory and whatever else might fall between the cracks must be taken into cognizance. He cited Sigmund Freud, that the unconscious is the source of our motivation, whether they be simple desires for food or sex, neurotic compulsions, or the motives of an artist or scientist. And yet, we are often driven to deny or resist becoming conscious of these motives, and they are often available to use only in disguised form.

Goldgeier et al (2005:87) suggested psychology's role in identifying boundary conditions as extremely useful in refining arguments within a given theoretical tradition. They submit that prospect theory identifies the conditions under which we expect more risk-averse or risk-taking behavior than an expected-utility model can explain when a more defensive or offensive realist argument should prevail or when redistributive schemes are likely to have greater or less appeal. They noted that Macro level theorists dismiss psychological theories for presenting obstacles to explaining the broad contours of international behavior. However, the authors welcome psychology's help in refining ideas in key debates regarding power, institution and norms. Ironically, the buzzwords that dominate recent macro level approaches to refine or advance theories are perceptions, ideas, and identify. Now is the time for International Relations theorists to take advantage of systematic arguments about psychological factors to address more explicitly the psychological dimensions of their variables.

### **Influence of Personality Factor on Decision Making in Foreign Policy**

Personality is the characteristic sets of behaviours, cognitions and emotional patters that evolve from biological and environmental factors. While there is no generally agreed definition of personality, most theories focus on motivation and psychological interactions with the environment one is surrounded by. According to American Psychological Association, personality refers to individual differences in characteristics patters of thinking, feeling and behaving. The study of personality focuses on two broad areas; one is understanding individual differences in particular personality characteristics such as sociability or irritability while the other is understanding how the various parts of a person come together as a whole (Encyclopedia of Psychology).

From the foregoing therefore, personality approach could be understood as the analysis of the effect of differences in characteristic patter of thinking, feeling and behaviours of leaders on foreign policy decisions, types and models. Spanner (1978) posits that nations and elites have certain "styles" which affect the manner in which they conduct themselves in the international arena, whether they initiate an action or react to what others are doing.

The concept of style thus assists an analyst in clarifying the ways in which a nation and its policy-makers are likely to view a specific situation, alternative course of action and the courses selected. Personality Approach in Foreign Policy examines the characteristic patter of thinking of leaders individually or as a group in order to analyze foreign policy decision. It is used to determine the effects of different personalities on foreign policy formulation and actions in the international system.

Jensen (1982: 14 – 15) stipulates that for personality to have optimum impact on foreign policy decisions, the leader must display a high level of interest in foreign affairs; he must possess high decisional latitude, the situation must be non-routine and information regarding the situation should be ambiguous. Margaret Hermann (1980) argued that by examining idiosyncrasies, characteristics and personality predictions regarding foreign policy decision-making can be made because such examinations can create a clear picture of likely personal behaviour, that is, predispositions. According to Rosati (1995), the structure of an individual cognition is reliant upon background, past experiences, individual role and inherent belief system. Ate (1990) expressed the opinion that in the underdeveloped countries of the Third world where institutional roles and procedures are highly personalized and ethicized, one would expect more profound impact of

personality factor in foreign policy than in the developed societies. This implies that the thinking pattern, character traits, belief system and values of leaders of Third world nations contribute more to foreign policy decisions than in the First world nations due to lack of strong institutions.

With politics being heavily autocratic, monarchical and dictatorial, in other words, unimpeded by bureaucracy, the Middle East could be a relevant example for the expression of personality in foreign policy decision-making. In such regimes, the leader tends to operate according to personal whims, unconstrained by bureaucracy or opposition forces. This condition lends itself neatly to the Middle East and leaders such as King Fahd of Saudi Arabia or the Sultans of the Gulf States. Hermann (2001:84) refers to this type of leaders as “predominant”.

According to this understanding, one would assume that Israel as a bureaucratic democracy would be less subject to the effects of personality on foreign policy decision-making than other States in the Middle East. However, Israel should perhaps be viewed as the exception rather than the rule. In contrast to many bureaucratized democratic States, Israel politics is highly militarized with a significant number of high-ranking politicians and decision-makers emanating from long standing military careers.

In analyzing the foreign policy of States therefore, the personality of a leader should be taken into account as one of the important variables that influences the success or failure of various activities ranging from military campaigns to organizational performance in business and management, to the character and quality of nation-state’s foreign and domestic policies. For example, the more charismatic, authoritative, democratic etc a leader is, the more it positively influences the State’s foreign policy. Different political analysts make different distinctions, although the most common is the categorization of political leaders and foreign policy decision-makers are either aggressive or conciliatory leaders. Other categories into which decision-makers could be placed include pragmatist or crusaders and ideologues or opportunists. Hermann (2001:86). Decision-makers could be grouped into either category by analysis of their personal characteristics, including beliefs, motives, decisional style and inter-personal style.

National leaders can use a set of rules to apply to different situations when they deal with international affairs. Pearson and Rochester divide foreign policy decision into three categories: Macro-Decisions, Micro-Decisions and Crisis Decisions. Macro-decisions are the kind of notion whose definition is more in line with what one expects from by a type of policy. These are decisions that are made mainly on issues that happen in a longer frame of time involving a larger number of actors, for instance, the nuclear deal between the P5 + 1 nations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Micro-decisions or ‘administrative’ decisions usually are the kind of actions that are ‘relatively’ narrow in scope, carry a low threat, and are handled at the lower levels of the bureaucracy, for instance, the Bakassi Peninsula talks between the Nigerian and Cameroonian roundtable discussion to trash out the details of the Green Tree Agreement.

The third type of decisions, crisis decisions is those ‘characterized by a sense of high threat (including the possibilities of military hostilities), a finite time frame, and involvement of officials at the highest levels, for example, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over ballistic missile stationed in Cuba by the Soviets (Pearson et al 1998).

Logical decision-making requires ‘(1) Information about the situation; (2) substantive knowledge of cause and effect, relationship that is relevant for assessing the expected consequences of alternative courses of actions; (3) a way of applying the value and interest engaged by the problem at hand in order to judge which course of action is ‘best’ and/or least costly and which therefore, should be chosen’. In reality most of the times these conditions are not met. ‘The policy maker must proceed under the handicap of severe constraint on the possibility of meeting these requirements of rational decision making. ‘Between dynamic and cognitive psychology, between the leader’s psychology and information processing and between the theory of high-quality decisions and their actual accomplishment’ (George, 1992).

But Rourke et al (1998) suggests that decision-making for foreign policy has three general aspects: How difference in the type of government, the type of policy, or the type of situation influence the policy process; The impact of political culture on foreign policy and the roles of the various political actions in making

foreign policy. About the type of situation, they explained that crisis situations are one factor that affects how policies made. A crisis is a circumstance in which decision makers are surprised by the events feel threatened (especially military) and believe that they have only a short time in which to make a decision. They explained how leaders have to make rational decisions. They explained how the differences between the status-quo situation and non-status-quo situations.

About the types of policy, they explained that it depends on different issues, different subject areas by different decision makers and different policy. They explained that the influence of political leaders because of the existence of different factors such as interest groups, legislators in domestic policy is less than foreign policy. The second one is about political culture on foreign policy that based on two sources. The first one is national historical experience and the second one is the national belief systems. The last aspects is about the role of political actors in making foreign policy (Rourke et al 1998).

Hagan (2001) mentions that in international relations, decision-making is an important phenomenon. He brings up the examples of the World War I, World War II and Cole War to show how the people in charge of decision-making change the course of events and bring a new direction to the whole process. During all these wars ‘the leadership in these countries was reacting to every real systemic pressure’s such as ‘the degree of uncertainly they generated, the value trade-offs they provoked, and the dispersion of decision authority they encountered’. Hagan emphasize on the uncertainly of the political situations and the way the leaders react to them. Depending on the complexity of the situation and the way the leadership reacts to the political process of events can go to a different direction (Hagan, 2001).

In a different analysis Grove (2007) pays attention to the different ways the leaders generate support among their constituents. He divided different strategies that the leaders use into four categories: broadening audience, buying off, tying hands, and framing threats. The first one is ‘broadening audience’ strategy refers to the ways that leaders use to expand their coalition with others in other to create the legitimacy for his political goals locally or intentionally, or create a shared identity for a great group of supporters. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad use such strategy towards Israel and the United States in order to receive more support in the Middle Eastern countries, similarly Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez use same to gain more popularity abroad. The second strategy in decision-making is ‘buying off’. To practice this strategy leaders pay off those who might have a role in political process to gain support ‘using material resources or promises of those resources to co-opt opposition abroad or at home’. These leaders use economic and military assistance, and investment opportunities from the other states or non-states, local or international actors to support them (Grove, 2007). The ‘tying hand’ strategy is a method to convince the audience that certain decisions should be made because there is no other choice left. George W. Bush’s strategy to convince his cabinets and the American people to invade Iraq after September 11 is a classic example of such strategy. The last strategy is ‘framing threat’ in which leaders characterizes certain political actors as an enemy or threat to gain popular support for their own agenda (Grove, 2007).

### **Crisis Decision Making and Personality Factor in Foreign Policy**

In a crisis, decision makers operate under tremendous time constraints. The normal processes of decision-making including checks on unwise decisions may not operate. Communications become shorter and more stereotyped, and information that does not fit decision maker’s expectations is more likely to be discarded simply because there is no time to consider it. The most obvious options are in consideration to save time; as emergency situation requires emergency response. Instances are so uncommon that we have to dwell on Nigerian’s foreign policy crisis decision making from Balewa to Jonathan. The first policy action on decolonization of Africa by the Balewa regime was taken shortly after independence in October 1960 following the Sharpeville incident in South Africa which claimed 69 people to be exact and left scores. This incident generated wild-spread indignation reaction across the Nigeria State (Akiba, 1998).

Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the opposition party – the Action Group (AG) called on the Nigerian Government to take immediate and effective steps against the Apartheid regime in South Africa. The Nigerian Prime Minister was particularly asked to expel all white South Africans and business interest from

Nigeria forthwith following the murderous Sharpeville incident. The Nigerian opposition leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo also urged Prime Minister Balewa to work towards expelling South Africa from the British Commonwealth because according to Awolowo, there could be no affinity or family ties with a sadist and barbaric regime that had ‘displayed a sadism and barbarism which are rare in the annals of man’ (ibid). In an apparent move to satisfy the yearnings of the populace, the Balewa regime took immediate steps towards South Africa by expelling the South African Dutch Reformed church from Nigeria. Furthermore, on April 5, 1960, a private member’s bill was passed which urge ‘the Government to take appropriate steps to ban the importation of South African goods in the country’. This was followed by other measures like the termination of the appointment of white South Africans who were in the services of the Nigerian Federal Government. The Nigerian government asked all the regional governments to follow suit. The Balewa regime also revoked the contracts which had been awarded earlier to South African Companies with a vow that no white South African would be offered employment again by the regime (ibid). Consequently, with the collective strength of other progressive countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Great Britain, Ghana, Pakistan, Malaysia, Tanzania and India, apartheid South Africa was forced to withdraw from the British Commonwealth in 1961 (Akiba 1998; Duke, 1999).

Following the apartheid regime’s expulsion from the Commonwealth, an enraged South African Prime Minister Verwoerd launched a barrage of verbal assault on those countries that facilitated South African’s ousting from the organisation. The then South African apartheid leader labelled them as ‘detractors’ ‘vindictive’ and ‘hypocritical’ elements. He particularly singled out the Nigerian Prime Minister for attack because of his view with respect to issues of white/non white relations in South Africa. Prime Minister Verwoerd accused and labelled Balewa a fanatic for not being realistic in his assessment of the racial policies in South Africa (Duke, 1999).

Another crisis decision making under Balewa emerged with the formation of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU). There was a battle of supremacy between Balewa and Nkrumah on whose country could speak for Africa in global fora. No wonder, the Balewa supported the Monrovia group, while Nkrumah sponsored the Casablanca group in the run – off to the establishment of the OAU, with the Monrovia group, seeking a gradual decolonization process whereas the Casablanca group was in concert with radical decolonisation process (Duke, 1999).

Nigeria’s backing of the UN led anti-Lumumba forces in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) was opposed by Ghana’s hard stance against the UN intervention in the Congo under the auspices of the UN without fully supporting the embattled Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba who had cried out for support from fellow African countries following the bombardment of his country by the forces of Cold War (Dukobo 2010). These were some of the manifestation of a deep-seated rivalry between Nigeria and Ghana for the leadership of Africa. Nkrumah’s radical pro-communist inclination and the support for radical opposition groups in Nigeria also underlay the rivalry between the two countries was summed as follows ‘anti Nkrumahism was a major factor theme of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the first republic’ (Osita, 2010).

Under General Gowon administration, the Nigerian leadership felt betrayed with the position of its West Africa neighbour’s particular Benin Republic who were sympathetic to the Biafra cause, by ordering the immediate/ partial closure of its border with the republic of Benin. Nigeria also broke diplomatic relations with Gabon, Tanzania, Cote’d Ivoire, and the French government which recognised the Biafra government (Duke 1999). However, after the civil-war, Nigeria demonstrated that it was willing to bury the hatchet when the Gowon regime restored diplomatic relations with Nigeria’s wartime adversaries namely: Zambia, Benin Republic, Tanzania and Cote’d Ivoire; African states that recognised Biafra during the civil war.

Nigeria’s Afrocentric posture was highly manifested in this regime especially in the handling of Angola crisis which eventually launched the Muritala regime into international limelight as a regime that was firmly committed in the African cause not minding whose ox is gored. Nigeria’s interest in the Angola struggle was mainly due to the involvement of the racist South Africa in the conflict. Nigeria had earlier supported a government of national unity in Angola comprising the three committed liberation movements which include the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA in line with the OAU’s position (Sotunmbi, 1990).

As the above situation played out, Nigeria was in the side-line watching and strategizing on which path to follow in the ensuing game. The Nigerian government having discovered that apartheid South Africa had deployed its troops into Angola to fight on the side of FLNA and UNITA, decided to commit itself to the MPLA (Garba, 1987: 49). The aim of South Africa and its co-travellers was to install 'a puppet reactionary regime' of the FLNA and UNITA. Nigeria firmly believes that the MPLA had the legitimate right to protect the aspirations of the legitimate right to respect the aspirations of the Angola people hence the moral, financial and diplomatic support that they were given by the Nigeria government,

Worried by the Muritala/Obasanjo regime's policy on the issue and the decision of the OAU to recognise the MPLA, President Ford of the United States wrote personal letters and also deployed the country's (U.S) diplomatic machinery to African leaders and government of the time to dissuade them from following the steps taken by Nigeria on Angola. The U.S urge those who had accorded recognition to the MPLA to reverse their decision. The United States machinations attracted a tougher reaction by the Muritala/Obasanjo regime. Nigeria replied with indignation and made its reply public. The regime took radical measures against the US when it cancelled the scheduled visit of the US, Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger to Lagos. The regime's relation with America deteriorated when the Nigerian government took over the US Information Service building and radio monitoring centres in Lagos and Kaduna respectively. On January 11, 1976, General Muritala Mohammed the Head of State of Nigeria delivered his powerful speech reaffirming Nigeria's nay Africa's position to the Angolan crisis and its support to the MPLA quest for leadership at the extraordinary summit of the OAU in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa where he criticised the West in strongest terms for aiding and abetting colonialism and also for paying lip service to the African colonial predicament and not taking critical steps to help end colonialism in Africa (ibid).

Other active commitment showed by the regime against apartheid in particular and colonialism in general included Nigeria's hosting of the first United Nations Conference against Apartheid in 1977 and the nationalisation of British petroleum and Barclay's Bank by the Nigerian government in 1979 when it became apparent that Britain was not favourably disposed to the issue of Zimbabwean independence. The decision to move against the British economic interests in Nigeria was to force the British government to prevail on the leadership of Zimbabwe to relinquish power (Aluko, 1980).

Under Muhammadu Buhari's administration Nigeria continued its aggressive anti-colonial policy in Southern Africa but the only diplomatic severance of tie, was between Nigeria and Morocco. Nigeria under Buhari also accorded recognition to the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on November 11, 1984, whose territory Western Sahara had been unlawfully occupied by the Moroccans since the Spanish left the country (ibid).

General Babangida in an attempt to match words with action held onto Nigeria policy on apartheid which he had inherited from his predecessors. The regime demonstrated that consistency and unyielding commitment to the liquidation of apartheid. As early as 1986, Nigeria pursuant to its declared anti-colonial objectives headed the list of 32 Commonwealth countries that boycotted the Commonwealth Games held in Edinburgh, Scotland in July, 1986. The decision by Nigeria and its fellow Commonwealth member countries which boycotted the games stemmed from the failure of the then British Prime Minister, Margret Thatcher to impose sanctions on South Africa as agreed earlier at the mini – Commonwealth Summit held in 1986. Consequently, Nigeria acted swiftly in order to give credibility to the country's Afro-centric foreign policy which was meant to project Nigeria as the most influential black African State (Duke, 1999).

The Commonwealth and the United Nations are two most important organisations, apart from those whose membership are restricted to African member states to which Nigeria belongs. The execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight of his fellow Ogoni activists on November 10, 1995, while the Commonwealth leaders were assembling in Auckland, New Zealand, provoked an unprecedented decision, with only one dissenting vote, (that of the military government of the Gambia) to suspend Nigeria from the organisation for two years, pending its 'return to compliance' with the principle of the Harare Declaration of 1991, in which all

members-states pledge to foster democracy, human rights and judicial independence. This punitive response was promoted strongly by the South Africa and Zimbabwe, as well as the British Prime Minister, who denounced the Nigerian government for having perpetrated 'judicial murder'. However, South Africa involvement in Nigeria's suspension from the commonwealth exacerbated the military juntas in Nigeria, who swiftly the following year (ie, 1996) withdrew the Super Eagles, despite their being the defending champion from participation in the African Nation Cup hosted by South Africa (Ogunlesi, 2013).

On a whole, the 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa where Nigerians were brutalized tempted one to ask if Nigerians deserve such brutality taking into cognisance the fundamental roles played by the country in dismantling apartheid (Eke 2009: 138) informed that Nigeria-South Africa's relations has been marked by discrimination against Nigerian in South Africa. He noted that the Nigeria's consulate in South Africa confirmed that many Nigerians were killed in 2007 extra-judicial circumstance. Lastly, on March, 2012, the South Africans requested that 125 Nigerians – an entire plane load – at Oliver Tambo airport, allegedly for possessing fake Yellow Fever cards. An angry Nigerian government immediately triggered its emergency response system. Within days Nigeria equalised – and then some 136 South African show the way back to their beloved country, ostensibly to protect them from contracting the yellow fever that is responsible for Nigerian's dysfunctional state. One of the most hilarious new reports from that time was the one that said 'South African prostitutes' were being deported from Nigeria. Until then, few had any idea that South African business interests in Nigeria extended to the sex trade.

### Conclusion

In the context of struggle and participation, states in the international arena compete for scarce resources and in the process conflict and crisis arise when not properly or effectively handled metamorphose to foreign policy decision making crisis. Crisis in most instances connotes high level of military hostilities, a situation states tends to avoid through peaceful diplomatic means for a safe and secure international environment. As individuals engage in private decision making so do states as sovereign entities engages on decision making which may be normal or crisis prone. Having noted that foreign policies are deliberate actions which are not made in a vacuum, we have examined the relationship that the paper seek to capture crisis decision making in foreign policy with particular reference to the Nigerian foreign policy decision making process since independence as a case study.

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