

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NATURE OF STATE INTERVENTION INTO VIGILANTE
GROUPS ACTIVITIES IN BENUE STATE

TERVER STEPHEN ANYO
Department of Sociology
Benue State University, Makurdi,
Benue State, Nigeria.
Contact:
Phone No: +2348061221368
e-mail: stevieanyo@yahoo.com

&

SAMUEL IORNENGE ZUMVE (PhD)
Department of Sociology,
Federal University, Dutsin-Ma,
Katsina State, Nigeria.
Contact:
Phone No: +2348034136970
e-mail: szumve@fudutsinma.edu.ng

Abstract

The study was titled the nature of state intervention into vigilante groups' activities in Benue State-Nigeria. The specific objective of the study was to: examine the nature of state intervention into vigilante groups' activities in Benue state. The paper was empirical in nature. Conflict theory was the adopted theory for the study. The sample size of the study was 400 respondents which were determined using Taro-Yamane's measure for sample determination. The population of the study was drawn from members of the public, vigilante officials, religious leaders, traditional ruler, and police officers resident in the study area. The study employed multi-stage sampling technique. Questionnaire, observation and interview were the instruments used for data collection. Data was analyzed, presented and interpreted in statistical form using percentage distribution. The study findings show that: that the state has intervened into vigilante groups' activities in Benue state. The nature of state intervention into vigilante groups' activities in Benue state is in the perspective of logistics, legislation, training, and structural reorganization of the agency. The study established that, with state intervention into vigilante groups activities, vigilante groups have become a formalised, uniformed, and ranked agency. The study recommends the following among others: provision of basic crime fighting equipment, adequate funding of vigilante groups, more logistics should be made available for vigilante groups, respect for the fundamental human rights of suspects, proper and effective training of vigilante personnel, enactment of laws establishing vigilante groups, official corruption should be checkmated among vigilantes.

Key Concepts: State, Intervention, State Intervention, and Vigilante Groups.

Introduction

The core assumption in the literature on vigilante phenomenon is that local communities organize vigilante groups primarily for the promotion and protection of internal and external security interest of the people. Alemika and Chukwuma (2000:3) posit thus:

Local communities across Nigeria, as in many other countries in Africa and

elsewhere, have created their own informal or sometimes formal structures to try to ensure the security of the population. These groups have usually been composed of individuals from the local community. They have derived their credibility, and unofficial authority from the community in which they serve. One of the main purposes of these initiatives has been to complement the police by identifying and handing over criminal suspects to the appropriate judicial authorities. They have also sometime tried to settle other conflicts between individuals in the community.

Recently, vigilante phenomenon has witnessed a paradigm shift from being voluntary, local, participatory, community evolved, and unofficial agencies to formalized state agencies. State intervention into community vigilante groups' activities explains the evolution of vigilante groups from their primary essence of establishment. The organizational and operational structures characterizing the ideal vigilante groups have changed. Vigilante phenomenon has succumbed to conflicting interests both at the Federal, State and community levels.

State governments in Nigeria are known to have tacitly or openly endorsed, and armed vigilante groups as part of their campaign against crime (Amnesty International, 2002; Akinyele, 2008). Sequel to the above, the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, almost all State Assemblies in Nigeria have enacted or initiated laws for the formalization of vigilante groups in the light of the increasing insecurity challenges in their communities. One may infer that, intervention into vigilante group's activities by governments both at the federal, state, and local levels is aimed at indirectly instituting a state policing agency to checkmate insecurity and secure lives and property of the populace. For instance, the establishment of Livestock Guard (Benue State Community Voluntary Guard) in Benue, Anambra Vigilante Groups in Anambra state, Yangoro (Civilian Joint Task Force) in Bornu State, Niger Delta Vigilante Groups, and recently, the agitation for the establishment of AMOTEKUN in the South western Nigeria attest to state governments attempt at supplementing the security needs of the state via vigilantism.

Nigeria's transition from military administration to civil rule in 1999 saw a fundamental shift in the activities and operations of vigilante groups. State governments have been directly involved in the establishment and sponsorship of vigilante groups across Nigeria. The operations of vigilante groups such as the Hisba, OPC and the Bakassi Boys are a good example of state intervention into vigilantism. More recently, vigilante groups popularly referred to as the Civilian Joint Security Task Force-Yangoro, which have been very useful in fighting Boko-Haram insurgency in the Northeast of Nigeria have received significant support and recognition from the state governments in the region. A combination of factors and dynamics may have accounted for the growing intervention of state governments into vigilante groups activities since year 2000. For example, the motivation for supporting the Civilian Joint Security Task Force by the state governments in the Northeast has been primarily driven by the insecurity challenges posed by the Boko-Haram terrorist group.

The creation of Hisba vigilantes by 12 state governments in Northern Nigeria upon the return to multiparty democracy in 1999 to implement and monitor compliance to Sharia reflects the politics of religion in Nigeria. Last (2008) has argued that, Hisba enforcers of Sharia code introduced in 12 states in the North in year 2000 was much more concerned with issues of physical and spiritual insecurity of Muslims. Accordingly, the non-Muslim population in the North defined as the others became targets, which sometimes resulted in violence especially in Kano. The Hisba, to some extent differ from the O'odua Peoples Congress (OPC) in Western Nigeria. Though, it emerged in the mid- 1990s, the OPC doubles as an ethnic militia fighting for the Yoruba political autonomy within a decentralized federal structure in Nigeria and also as a vigilante group involved in fighting crime especially in Lagos. It was officially recognized by the Lagos State House of Assembly and therefore has the support and backing of the Lagos state government (Reno 2002).

The Bakassi Boys on the other hand, was a case of cooption by the Abia government to help complement security services in the state. An initiative of the Aba shoemakers initially known as the Artisans Traders Welfare Association of Nigeria, situated at the shoe market called Umuehilegbu Industrial Shoe Market. The body visited the governor of Abia state and the Commissioner of Police and presented a

memorandum, which contained on aim and objectives (Obot, 2003). The social origin of the Bakassi Boys was primarily to confront rampant criminality, particularly armed robbery in the urban city of Aba amongst Igbo traders. Bakassi Boys has been largely criticized for its instant systems of judgment and barbaric killings of thieves based on automatic presumption of guilt (Human Rights Watch 2002). The successes and popularity of Bakassi Boys in combating the menace of armed robbery in Aba led to its adoption by neighbouring Anambra state. The Bakassi Boys soon became a tool in the hands of both rival market trade unions and the Governor of Abia state for scoring political points in terms of fighting perceived and real enemies (Harrischfeger 2008). The consequence of state intervention into the activities of the group was that Bakassi Boys lost their autonomy, and its leadership degenerated to the extent that the federal government had to ban the organization in 2002.

Therefore, in recognition of the role of the vigilante groups, component governments in Nigeria have enacted laws legitimizing their functions. For example, the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in (2017) initiated a bill for the legalization of vigilante groups in Nigeria. In a similar vein, the Anambra state government enacts the *Vigilante Service Act (2000)* to provide for the registration of vigilante groups in Anambra State (ICHRP, 2002). The aim is to limit their size, funding, restructure and regulate their activities generally. Similarly, the Benue state government declares through the *Community Volunteer Guards Law (2000)* that there is need to legalize, restructure, and regulate the activities of the vigilante in the state as they have been found to be helpful and complementary to the police in keeping peace and security.

Unfortunately, vigilante groups' have turned their loyalty to the elite, helping in actualizing the nefarious motives, objectives or goals of state and have often played along with their preferences (Umeagbalasi, 2012). These changes in vigilantism are obtainable in various communities across Nigeria where the vigilante groups' members would always submit to the wishes of the ruling class in the society or where they are used as instruments of power tussle between politicians aspiring for leadership positions. With the increasing intervention of the state into vigilante groups' activities and the corresponding challenges of state intervention into vigilantism, one then wonders if the motives for the establishment of the local vigilante groups are being achieved or marred.

The vigilante groups presently in existence in Nigeria have underwent institutional, structural, and operational transformations. Vigilante groups have been accorded legal recognition as vigilante groups working in the communities for the state. However, with the recent legal framework formalizing vigilante groups in Benue state and some other states in Nigeria, they are currently elevated to the status of government agencies working for the state by confronting states' peculiar security challenges. Having been established by law of a state, they are now uniformed, ranked, and funded by the state hence this study seeks to examine the nature of state intervention in vigilante groups' activities in Benue State.

Statement of the Research Problem

Vigilante groups have become an essential part of the everyday security landscape of most communities across Nigeria. The proliferation of vigilante groups across Nigeria is indicative of the need for an alternative response to the general insecurity challenges that bequeath Nigeria with near absence of viable formal policing agencies. Some state governments in Nigeria have adopted and formalized vigilante groups as part of their campaign against insecurity. The formalization of vigilante groups by the state has resulted in misconceptions and misappropriation of vigilante phenomenon.

Most studies on vigilante phenomenon have aggregated the activities of formalized and informal vigilante structure without pointing out their structural, functional, and operational differentiations. A study by Alemika and Chukwuma (2004) focused on the typologies of vigilantism. These are: religious vigilantism, ethnic vigilantism, state-sponsored vigilantism and community voluntary 'vigilantism'. Their names suggest their origin, purposes of establishment, and *modus operandi*. However, the study failed to account for the nature of state intervention into the activities of vigilante groups. Vigilantism seems to be gaining more prominence in Benue state. Contemporary security challenges led to the emergence of such vigilante groups now operating in both rural and urban areas of the state. This study seeks to assess the nature of state intervention into vigilante groups activities in Benue state. The research question for this study is:

What is the nature of state intervention into vigilante group's activities in Benue state? The objective of the study is to examine the nature of state intervention into vigilante groups activities in Benue state.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

This segment of the study dwells on the clarification of concepts and the adopted theoretical framework for the study. The following concepts form this section of the study. State, Intervention, State Intervention, and Vigilante Groups. Conflict theory is the adopted theoretical strand for this discourse.

State: The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary defines the state as a country considered as an organized political community controlled by government, the territory occupied by this, it is also an organized political community forming part of a country, it is also the civil government of a country. To highlight the definition above, state is a society of people politically organized within a definite territory, having its own government with coercive power to enforce obedience and which is free from external control. Marx (1818-1883) and Engels (1820-1895) have made different statements which constitute the fabric of state theory. They said that the state is the "political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another." They said "the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." For the purposes of this study, state is a cabal that runs the government of a country to foster and maintain their socio-economic and political dominance.

Intervention: is the action taken by an institution, individual, and organization to intentionally become involved in a situation in order to improve its functioning or prevent its eminent collapse <https://dictionary.Cambridge.org>. Again, intervention is the act of interfering with the outcome or course especially of a condition or process to prevent harm or improve functioning <https://www.Merriam-webster.com>. These definitions of the concept intervention hold that, institutions, individuals, and organizations intervene to improve functioning and rescue perceived dysfunctional organizations. This implies that, state intervention in vigilante groups' activities is meant to improve the functioning of the agency. For the purposes of clarity, the following words are adopted as synonyms of intervention and used intermittently in the study: interference, involvement, intercession, interposition, stepping in, and intrusion.

State intervention: is the regulatory actions taken by a government or a constituted authority in order to affect or interfere with decisions made by individuals, groups, organizations regarding social and economic matters. For the purposes of this thesis, state intervention is seen as the intentional, deliberate and purposeful involvement of the government of Benue state into the activities of vigilante groups (supposedly civil society organisation).

The Concept of Vigilante Groups

The concept of the vigilante has its roots in the Latin word *vigilans*, connoting a 'watchman,' 'guard' or someone who 'watches.' In its more recent usage, the term has been used to describe (non-state) armed groups that use violent means to mete out extra-judicial punishment to those accused of committing specific crimes in a local community or society. Thus, a vigilante group, within its own conception of crime, appropriates the authority of the police in order to provide a safer community. According to Johnston (1996), five elements of vigilante activity are:-

- i. Minimal planning, preparation or premeditation.
- ii. Private agents acting in a voluntary capacity.
- iii. Activity undertaken without the state's authority or support.
- iv. A reaction to the real or perceived transgression of institutionalized norms.
- v. Aims to offer people the assurance that established order will prevail.

The third element of vigilante groups as proposed by Johnston (1996) above, vigilante groups' activities are supposedly undertaken without the state's authority and support. Therefore, the recent establishment of state vigilante groups, and state intervention in voluntary vigilante groups' activities berates the essence of vigilante groups. This heightens the misappropriation and misconception of the phenomenon of vigilantism.

According to Baker (2003), vigilantism is a category of non-state or self-policing structure. It is

characterized by, ad hoc and often violent methods of operation. A vigilante is a group of committed people at the micro level of the community, set to collate information on suspected criminals in its area, for use by the police in the detection and prevention of crime. It is often made up of private individuals and groups such as landlords, tenants, community associations and leaders of neighbourhood, who keep watch over their area and report suspicious people to the police. A vigilante is a private individual who illegally or legally punishes an alleged law breaker, or participates in a group which metes out extralegal punishment to an alleged law breaker. Bakers', conception of vigilante groups gives an ideal view of the vigilante as voluntary associations operating at the micro level of the society. Vigilante groups operates at the macro levels of the society in Nigeria, some are even established and sponsored by government, individuals, and socio-cultural groups. Albeit, state sponsored vigilantism is a recent development in Nigeria. He also noted that, vigilante groups are not independent agencies. They compliment the formal policing agencies. There interdependence on formal policing agencies may have informed state intervention in vigilante activities.

According to *Chambers 20th Century Dictionary*, vigilantism is a phenomenon which, in the absence or inefficiency of regular government agencies of crime control, exercises power of arrest, punishment of criminals, prevention of crime, and public order maintenance. *Encyclopedia Americana* vol. 28:113-114 cited in (Dumke, 2003) aver that, vigilante is the name given to self appointed law enforcement groups who appeared from time to time on the American frontier and occasionally in older communities where established authority seemed unable to cope with lawlessness and disorder. Here, vigilante groups are seen as reactionary agencies. They respond to the absence and inability of the formal policing agencies. This implies that, vigilante groups' function only when there is perceived ineffectiveness of the formal policing agencies not as complimentary agencies to the formal policing agencies.

Hayson, (1986) Bruce and Kamane, (1999) in their conception of vigilante groups, have argued that, in South Africa, the term vigilantism took on certain meanings across two recent periods: pre –1994 (Apartheid era) and post – 1994 (post – Apartheid era). Literatures reveal that during the Apartheid era, the term “vigilantism” generally conveyed violent actions that were political or interpreted as such.

In Nigeria, the term vigilante is commonly used loosely to refer to a range of groups, each with different motives. The term has been applied to groups such as the Bakassi Boys, who were initially set up for the purpose of fighting crime without an explicit political agenda, and to others such as Odua People's Congress (OPC), the Yoruba ethnic militia active in South West of Nigeria. The OPC was initially created to advocate for autonomy for the Yoruba people. However, from 1999, it changed its fundamental objective of seeking self-determination for the Yoruba people to crime fighting activities and the settlement of personal disputes. In some of the Northern States in Nigeria, there are other groups known as Hisba groups referred to as vigilantes, which are used to monitor and enforce the observance of Sharia laws and recently the emergence of the Yangoro in Borno state which are instrumental in the fight against Boko-Haram. In Benue State, vigilante groups are voluntary community agencies, and State sponsored. The former denotes a group of people formed by members of the community to due to the inability of the formal policing agencies to bring the increasing insecurity challenges in the State under control. The latter are referred to as Civilian Joint Task Force, Livestock Guards, and Benue State Community Volunteer Guards, in recent parlance.

Conflict Theory

Conflict theory evolved out of the writings of Karl Marx. The crux of conflict theory predates Marx, although Marx's work gave it the present form and popularity it has. Conflict theory breaks with the Durkheimian view of the primacy of society over the individual by focusing on the notion of power as the mediating factor in its concept of binary opposition and further opened the door to a number of other theories especially in those areas where the concept of binary opposition and the notion of power gave support. There are many variations of the conflict perspective within sociology as pointed out by Haralambos and Holborn (2000). The focus of this study will be on conflict paradigm in criminology.

Conflict theory in criminology is associated with the works of Bonger (1916) and Dahrendorf (1959). Conflict theory in criminology sees society as constantly responding to social inequality and social conflict. The theory assumes that it is specifically the “ruling class” who benefit from particular social arrangements and how those in power maintain their positions and reap benefits from them. The “ruling or

elite class” are seen as a group that spread certain values, beliefs, norms and social arrangements including policies on security in order to enhance its power and wealth. Therefore, the elite class represents the state. This explains the recent intervention into the activities of vigilante groups by governments in Nigeria both at federal, state, and local levels.

Conflict theorist opined that social order results from the dominant group ensuring that subordinate groups are loyal to the policies and institutions that are the dominant group’s source of wealth, power and prestige. This explains the consequences of state intervention into vigilante group’s activities. The transformation of and changes in vigilante groups from being local, community based, voluntary and participatory agencies to state formalized agencies is a reflection of the group dominance of ‘state intervention into vigilante groups’.

There are two broad types of conflict school in criminology. These are conflict criminology and “Marxist criminology” or non-Marxist conflict theory in criminology. The latter is referred to as conflict criminology and the former is called Marxist criminology. Scholars such as Dahrendorf (1958) and Vold (1933) made significant pioneering contributions to the development of the group conflict theory in criminology which is the adopted strand for this study. Conflict theorists writing in the 1960s and early 1970s sought to explain why some people and their activities have the greater chance of being labeled anti social than others; the theorists emphasized the conflicts that arise when interests clash, and roles that power and authority play in legislation, adjudication and enforcement processes in the society. Here, the formalization of vigilante groups by the state via extant legislation contravenes the essence of vigilante groups. It is out right state imposition of its fiat on the local safe help agency. State intervention into vigilante groups is a preparatory ground for the usurpation of the local agency by the state.

The elite promote particular notions of security to suit their own interest. The conspiracy between the elite via the legislature, judicial and executive arms of government is paramount for the formulation, administration and execution of public policies on government involvement into vigilante group’s activities in Nigeria. This is intended to create and establish more security outfits or agencies for the protection of the elite security interest. The social reality of state intervention into vigilante groups activities is enhanced by the state statutory powers to formulate and execute security policies within its territory. Therefore, in a society where security policies are constructed in segmental and asymmetrical manner in relation to social stratification, within this context the more power a segment has in the creation of enforcement of the law agencies, the less likely it is that its members will be vulnerable to insecurity challenges.

In view of the above, the elite class in Nigeria at large and Benue state in particular feels threatened by the growing insecurity challenges in society. They (elite) have perceived the formal policing agencies as being inadequate and ineffective to cater for their safety and security need. Therefore, being (the elite) policy makers-they have extended their policy thrust on the activities of vigilante groups hence state intervention into vigilante groups activities. State intervention into vigilante group’s activities in is directed at taking over local community vigilante agencies by the state.

The strength and relevance of group conflict theory in criminology in explaining state intervention into vigilante group’s activities is that the theory has x-rayed and exposed the elite class attempt at usurping vigilante agency towards actualizing the long conceived state police agenda of the state. State intervention into vigilante activities would further widen the security gap between the rich and the poor. The usurpation of vigilante groups by the state will result to the neglect of the security and safety needs of the less-privilege members of the society. However, the adopted theoretical framework has its criticism, deficiencies and inadequacies as mentioned below, but it is relevant in explaining the idea behind state intervention into vigilante groups in activities in Benue state.

Conflict criminology has the following criticisms: conflict theorist assumes that it is only the interest of the powerful that are /or is protected by security agencies. Conflict theory concentrates too much on conflict and change but too little on what produces stability in society.

Nature of State Intervention into Vigilante Groups Activities

The public loss of trust and confidence in the state security agencies, in the face of unrelenting upsurge in insecurity challenges in the society, led to the advent and formation of vigilante groups.

Abrahansen and Williams (2005) had stated that the limited state capacity to provide safety and security to the public has led to self help responses on the part of citizens including vigilante activity.

Different associations and institutions in Nigeria such as traditional institutions, religious organizations, tribal associations, youth groups, street clubs, transport unions, motor-cycle hirers groups, faith-based associations, community forums, neighbourhood organizations, and local entrepreneurs team together to provide for themselves security through vigilantism. The compositions of vigilante groups are mostly people residing within the community and who speak local languages of the setting. They do not use formal legal terminology and procedure in the engagement of safety and security of their given vicinities. Where this is done, security and safety response is more or less guaranteed. This makes them more familiar and accessible with their local knowledge of the social setting. They commonly resolve disputes between neighbours, restrain antisocial behaviours and protect homes at night. They exist, not because the state agencies are not carrying out their responsibility, but because complementary policing roles are invaluable.

Smith (2007) averred that public yearning for vigilantism could be considered as a response to wide spread negative perception that the police, the courts and other institutions of the state were too corrupt to curtail the level of crime-insecurity. This is not true. Vigilante groups exist to cater for safety and security needs of the downtrodden of the society. According to Ojukwu (2011), vigilante groups are prominent in the informal policing system particularly to the poor masses since members of the vigilante groups are usually members of the community who are locally-based. The basic underlining idea here is that, safety and security partnership between the local vigilante and the community is commendable.

Vigilante groups are now recognized both unofficially and officially as informal security operatives. They are engaged in private capacity by residents of streets and communities, and by some other groups, for their private security needs. The vigilante groups are seen as a structure of community policing that respond to the security needs of the neglected communities. They are unofficial group within a community that partner with the community to keep watch in a community for the purposes of maintaining law and order.

The changes in vigilantism and the fact that various states of the federation are giving approval and solid support to the role of vigilante groups indicates that their operations are valued and patronized. However, a number of concerns have engaged the minds of scholars and well-meaning individuals as regards their operational and organizational changes emanating from state intervention into the activities of vigilante groups. These concerns range from the formalization of the vigilante groups through legislations, the redefinition of the structural organization of vigilante groups, the training they receive, the remuneration and upkeep of the vigilantes, to the allegiance of the vigilante members to the state authority as well as the level of cooperation between the groups and the conventional security forces of the state. One may be quick to posit that; the logistics, organizational structure, and legal challenges vigilante groups had faced may be the precipitating factors for state intervention into vigilante activities in Nigeria.

The Justice for All Group (2012) noted that in order to improve the overall performance of the vigilante groups, constant technical support and funding intervention from the state must be given the group to enhance the better operation of its members. Justice for All Group also emphasized that relevant information about the growing trend and sophistication in insecurity including, but not limited to the overall direction of prevention and policing; observance of guidelines on human rights and policing must be given to the vigilante groups by the formal state policing agencies in the course of vigilante training. Alemika and Chukwuma (2003) stated that the meagre remuneration paid to the vigilante groups by the community has been one of the factors limiting the effectiveness of the groups in their security services.

They maintained that the remuneration challenges may provide vigilantes a temptation to engage in (more lucrative) criminal activities, as well as deter good men from entering the service. Knowland (2014), observed that in Mexico, certain vigilante groups that started by helping out in countering kidnapping and drug dealing sometimes deviated into drug dealing and exportation themselves; due to lack of adequate remuneration and strict regulation of their activities. Therefore, the vigilante groups needed better motivation through funding, and state regulatory policies in order to motivate their performance. Justice for All Group (2012) maintained that even though vigilante services properly understood are voluntary, yet there should be some measure of reward and welfare to the members which should serve as an incentive and a motivation to enhance their services. The above literatures hold that vigilante groups are faced with remuneration

challenges. Therefore, the state has intervened to make the vigilante groups a salaried agency.

Despite the perceived effectiveness and commitment of vigilante groups to the safety and security of the people, their operations have been noted to face many challenges. These challenges may have prompted state intervention into vigilantism in Nigeria. Marx and Archer (1999) noted five outstanding organizational problems which the vigilante groups are facing. These problems are their relationship to the police and legal system; their legitimacy in the eyes of the communities they wish to serve; the recruitment and management of personnel; the choice of appropriate operations; and the maintenance of resources, incentives, and motivation for the groups' survival. Alemika and Chukwuma (2003) identified their problems as: lack of funding by the government, harassment from the police when carrying out their duties, lack of proper training and adequate arms, lack of basic operational equipment such as flashlights, warm clothing, rain boots, rain coats, identity cards, whistles, uniforms etc.

Other shortcomings experienced by the vigilante groups include, poor screening of new members and presence of touts or 'bad eggs' among the vigilante members, multiplicity of the organizations, and poor accountability by the groups. Ekeh, (2002) posits that, Nigerian communities no longer rely on the police for their security; rather they have resorted to unregulated and violent reprisal against suspected sources of their collective endangerment. To Olaniyi (2005), vigilante groups often encounter threats from hoodlums who use sophisticated weapons in their robbery operations. He equally noted that the vigilante groups have problem of lack of cooperation among the members of the group particularly from the higher-ranking officers who do not respect certain decisions made. State intervention into vigilante groups' organization may be in the following perspectives: non-availability of legal frame work establishing vigilante groups, organizational structure, operational, and logistics challenges characterizing the vigilante groups overtime.

The House of Representatives of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from 20/07/2016, 01/11/2016, and 02/11/2017 proposed a bill for an act to establish the vigilante groups of Nigeria (VGN) charged with the responsibility to, among others, provide community policing, maintenance of law and order and community service for Nigerians and for related matters, 2017(HB.718). The bill had passed through the first, second, and third reading of the National Assembly procedures. Vigilante groups of Nigeria (Establishment) Bill, 2017 (HB.718) is arranged in clauses. Part- 1 of the clauses specifies the Establishment of Vigilante Groups and Governing Board of Group. Part-2 Functions of Vigilante Groups. Part-3. Command Structure of Vigilante Groups. Part-4. Uniforms, Equipments and Ranks. Part 5-Financial Provisions; and Part 6-Discipline. This bill clearly shows how the federal government is poised at intervening into the activities of vigilante groups via statutory measures, structural and operational reorganization of the group, and logistics. State intervention into the vigilante groups may cause significant changes in the structural organization, modus operandi of the vigilante group's activities.

Similarly, House of Assembly of Benue State, on the 20th July, 2000 enacted a law to provide for the establishment of community volunteer guards (Vigilante) and for purposes connected therewith. The law in itself represents state intervention into the activities of vigilante groups in Benue state. This is to the extent that vigilante groups which are supposedly unofficial and local agency do not require statutory provisions for its organization and operations. The law has also formalized the structural organization, mode of operations of the vigilante groups, provided for logistics provision by the state, statutory state funding of the vigilante groups, and the nature of arms to be used by the group.

Sequel to the above, Benue State Government has donated over 400 pairs of boots and uniforms to the men of Benue State Vigilante Groups of Nigeria (The Voice, 2000). As a follow up and response to the state intervention into vigilante groups in Benue state, the Governor Ortom led government of Benue state has provided vehicles, arms, and other related logistics for vigilante groups, and has initiated procedures for enrolling vigilantes on the state and local government pay rolls. State intervention into vigilante affairs is invariably usurpation of local, community voluntary vigilante groups by the state governments. The trend of state intervention into vigilantism is not peculiar to state Benue state. This is common to other states in Nigeria where vigilante groups operate initially as community based agencies and safe help strategies.

The north-east state governments now offer financial and logistic support in the form of vehicles and other materials to the civilian JTF-Yangoro in appreciation of its role in checking the activities of the insurgents (Nigerian Watch, 2014). The government also offered employment to about 5,000 more into the

civilian JTF after training them for counterterrorism duties (Premium Times, 2013). Groups such as the Bakassi Boys in Abia, Imo, and Anambra states; the Vigilante Group of Nigeria in Kaduna; and O’odua People’s Congress in Lagos patrolled the streets at night in an effort to reduce security threats in their local areas. These groups are officially legalized and adopted by the government as state vigilante groups, meant to augment existing formal security services. To this end, formalized vigilante groups had the ability to arrest suspects but not detain them; instead, they were required to immediately turn over suspects to formal policing agencies. It is common knowledge that local vigilante groups often operated in parallel to the official government vigilante groups. State sponsored vigilante groups received financial support from the state governments while local vigilante groups are supported and funded by their host communities.

In the recent past, governments at the federal, state, and local levels may have significantly intervened in vigilante phenomenon in Nigeria. The nature of state intervention in vigilante group’s activities cut across the formalization of vigilante groups via statutory acts-establishing, recognizing and empowering the agency to function. Provision of logistics support to the group in form of uniforms, torch lights, raincoats, and baton. Partnering with the formal policing agencies for enhanced security training of vigilantes. Provision of welfare packages for the group. Structural and operational reorganization of vigilant groups. Arming of the vigilante groups. However, the survey would affirm or prove otherwise on the nature of state intervention in vigilante groups as presented above.

Methodology

The paper is empirical in nature; the study was a survey design. A survey research is the collection of data by asking individuals questions either in person, on phone, on paper or online. Survey was used to gather the opinions, beliefs, and feelings of selected groups of individuals chosen for demographic sampling. The survey design was adopted to measure the relationship between the nature of state intervention into vigilante group’s activities in Benue state. The research population for the study consists of members of the public, Traditional rulers, Religious leaders, Police officer, and officers of Vigilante groups within Benue state. Multistage sampling technique was used to arrive at the selection of the desired respondents. In this study, three methods were employed for data collection. They are; questionnaire, interview, and observation. The study integrated qualitative and quantitative technique of analysis, more significantly in the presentation and analysis of the socio-demographic attributes of the respondents. Generally, the data was triangulated. For the quantitative data, variables were quantified in tables and frequencies then expressed in percentage distribution.

Presentation and Analysis of Data

This section of the study presents data on the nature of state intervention in vigilante groups’ activities in Benue.

Table 1: Whether the state has intervened into vigilante groups’ activities in Benue state

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	216	60.6	60.6	60.6
No	96	27.0	27.0	87.6
Don't Know	44	12.4	12.4	100.0
Total	356	100.0	100.0	

Source: 2019 Field Survey Data

On whether the state has intervened into vigilante groups’ activities in Benue state suggests that,

60.6% of the respondents maintained that the Benue state government has intervened into the activities of vigilante groups while 12.4% respondents don't know whether the government of Benue state has intervened into the activities of vigilante groups in the locality. Generally, the responses on state intervention into vigilante groups' activities in Benue hold that the state has intervened into the activities of vigilante groups. This is premised on the fact that, the government of Benue state overtly endorsed and supported the operations of vigilante groups. The visibility of Benue state intervention into the activities vigilante groups could be seen from the establishment of agencies such Benue State Community Vigilante Guards, and Livestock Guards. The Benue vigilante law, patrol vans, motorcycles, and uniformed the Benue state government has provided for Benue state vigilante groups is evidential of state intervention into vigilante activities. The responses of the key informants hold that the Benue state government has intervened into the activities of vigilante groups. This is in view of government support and emphasis on vigilante activities in the state. It was observed that, Benue state government is in the vanguard of the support for the operation of vigilante groups in Benue state.

Table 2: The nature of state intervention into vigilante group activities in Benue state

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Logistics Provision	142	39.8	39.8	39.8
Formalization of vigilante groups	86	24.2	24.2	64.0
Structural reorganization of vigilante	84	23.6	23.6	87.6
Others (Training)	44	12.4	12.4	100.0
Total	356	100.0	100.0	

Source: 2019 Field Survey

Data on the nature of state intervention into vigilante groups operations suggests that 39.8% of the responses gathered see the provision of logistics to vigilante groups by the Benue state government as most form of state intervention into vigilante groups activities while 12.4% of the respondents noted the training of vigilantes in Benue as another aspect of state intervention into vigilante groups. The responses above portend that Benue state government has intervened into vigilante group through logistics provision, formalization of the group via legislation (BSCVG Law, 2000) the structural reorganization of vigilante groups, and training of vigilantes in the locality hence the responses above.

The key informants said vigilante groups have undergone tremendous structural and operational transformation in the recent past. This is to the extent that; Benue state government has intervened into vigilante groups activities in varying ways as shown on table 9 above. Benue state government has intervened into the vigilante groups activities through enactment of legislations establishing, recognizing, and empowering vigilante groups to operate. The state provides logistics such as raincoats, torch lights, uniforms, vehicles, arms for the group. In specific terms, Benue state government has provided fifty (50) motorcycles and nine (9) Hilux vans to Benue vigilante groups to facilitate their patrols. Structurally, vigilante groups have experienced significant organizational and operational changes. Benue vigilante groups' personnel are a ranked and uniformed agency. With the state intervention into vigilante groups activities there are proposals on making the group a salaried agency. Officials of Benue state vigilante groups are given stipends of (10,000 Naira) on monthly basis. Vigilantes now receive security training in collaboration with state formal policing agencies.

It was observed that vigilante groups' activities are being intervened by the Benue state government. This is taken from the fact that, vigilante groups have underwent evolution from their local, voluntary, and unofficial status to official and state formalized agencies. However, the neighbourhood watch groups are still in existence in some communities in Benue state. This form of vigilante groups retains its community based, local and voluntary nature. The neighbourhood watchers are not usurped by the Benue state government hence they not uniformed and ranked. They are owned and managed by the local communities whose safety and security needs are neglected by the state formal agencies of policing.

It is clear that, the nature of state intervention into vigilante groups' activities in Benue state is more

visible in the perspective of formalization, structural and operational restructuring, logistics, and personnel development through basic security training. The funding challenges of the vigilante groups are unattended to as can be seen from both responses. Even with state intervention into vigilante groups activities. However, local vigilante groups are not beneficiaries of state intervention. They depend on their host communities for their logistics needs. They are non-bureaucratic in nature.

Table 3: Reasons the State Intervened into vigilante groups activities

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
To partner with community safety agencies	96	26.9	26.9	26.9
To reward community security	64	18.0	18.0	44.9
To bring security to the grassroots	86	24.2	24.2	69.1
To strengthen vigilante groups via law	31	8.7	8.7	77.8
To reorganize vigilante groups	79	22.2	22.2	100.0
Total	356	100.0	100.0	

Source: 2019 Field Survey

Respondents are asked to state why Benue state government has intervened into vigilante groups' activities. The question brought forth varying responses, 26.9% of the respondents suggested that the need for partnership with community based safety agencies for enhanced security while 8.7% of the respondents say to strengthen vigilante groups via law precipitate state intervention into vigilante groups' activities Benue state. The data above implies that, because vigilantes' services are viable security and safety agencies, the state wishes to partner with the community agencies for enhanced security of the people. The key informants adduced reasons why the Benue state government has intervened into vigilante groups' activities in Benue. The reasons adduced are akin to those presented quantitatively above. See table 3. Nevertheless, it was observed that state intervention into vigilante groups' activities is an indirect way of establishing and actualizing state governments' in Nigeria aspiration for federating state police agencies in Nigeria.

Table 4: The impact of state intervention on vigilante groups activities in Benue state

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	196	55.1	55.1	55.1
No	126	35.4	35.4	90.4
Don't Know	34	9.5	9.5	100.0
Total	356	100.0	100.0	

Source: 2019 Field Survey

Data on the impact of state intervention into vigilante groups' activities in Benue state suggests that, 55.1% of the respondents maintained that there is a significant impact of state intervention into vigilante groups' activities in Benue state while 9.5% respondents don't know the impact of state intervention into vigilante groups' activities in Benue state. Generally, the responses on the impact of state intervention into vigilante activities in Benue hold that the locality remains relatively secured with the intervention of the state into the activities of vigilante groups. This is premised on the fact that, there is no day that passes without vigilante groups detecting and forestalling insecurity challenge in Benue. The visibility of vigilante operative in their patrol vans deters the execution of criminality in the communities which makes Benue and it's environ relatively secured.

The responses of the key informants hold that the insecurity situation in Benue state is reducing in view of government intervention into vigilante groups' activities in the state. Again, the informants hold that, state provision of logistics to vigilante groups such as patrol vans has facilitated the mobility of vigilantes. This enhances vigilante groups' rapid response to security threats. The intervention of the state

into vigilante groups’ activities logistics wise has placed the Benue state vigilante groups above the local community vigilante groups in terms of rapid response to distress calls. Community watch groups are in perpetual lack of logistics such as patrol vans for mobility-to facility their patrol activities, torch lights, and raincoats while state government supplies the needed logistics for state sponsored vigilante groups. The formalisation of vigilante groups via state legislation has made the Benue state vigilantes’ agency a legal entity. This has resolved the public perceptions of vigilante groups as illegal agency.

It was observed that, state intervention into vigilante groups’ activities in Benue state has impacted on the operational strategies of the vigilante groups. This is because vigilante groups originally are community’s proactive agency. State sponsored vigilante groups have adopted reactive strategies. They wait to be invited to respond to the safety and security needs of the community. This implies that, state sponsored vigilante groups have assumed the character of state formal policing agencies. However, the community vigilante groups combine proactive and reactive strategies.

Ways to strengthen vigilante groups in Benue state

The section dwells on the suggested ways to strengthen vigilante groups’ activities in Benue state.

Table 5: Suggest ways to strengthen vigilante groups activities in Benue state

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Adequate funding of Vigilante groups	56	15.7	15.7	15.7
Safeguard of fundamental human rights	66	18.5	18.5	34.3
Training of Vigilante	33	9.3	9.3	43.5
Vigilante should desist from abuse of authority	26	7.3	7.3	50.8
Official corruption should be checkmated	30	8.4	8.4	59.3
Provision of logistics	31	8.7	8.7	68.0
Vigilante groups should prioritize the safety and security of the community	52	14.6	14.6	82.6
Proposed laws formalizing Vigilante groups should be assented to by the Executive	31	8.7	8.7	91.3
Vigilantes should be included in the state payroll	31	8.7	8.7	100.0
Total	356	100.0	100.0	

Source: 2019 Field Survey

The table above show varying suggestions on how to strengthen vigilante groups for its enhanced activities in the society. Here 18.5% of the respondents suggested the safeguard of fundamental human rights while 7.3% of the respondents posit that the vigilante groups should desist from abuse of authority.

The key informant’s respondents suggested that creation of employment opportunities for the teaming unemployed population would reduce the spate of insecurity in the society hence there will be less work for security agencies, public enlightenment on security issues would strengthen vigilante groups activities in Benue, and community policing should be the concern of all people.

The responses gathered from the three research instruments employed by the study were in near agreement on findings on state intervention in vigilante groups activities in Benue state. The extent of agreement established by the study findings significantly explain the nature of state intervention in the activities of vigilante groups in the Benue state.

Discuss of Findings

The study established that vigilante groups have undergone tremendous structural and operational transformation in the recent past. This is to the extent that; Benue state government have intervened into vigilante groups activities in varying ways. Benue state government has intervened into the vigilante groups

activities through enactment of legislations establishing, recognizing, and empowering vigilante groups to operate. In a nut shell, the legislation has or is directed at formalizing vigilante groups. The state provides logistics such as raincoats, torch lights, uniforms, vehicles, arms for the group. Structurally, vigilante groups have experienced significant organizational and operational changes. With the state intervention into vigilante groups activities there are proposals on making the group a salaried agency. Vigilantes now receive security training in collaboration with state formal policing agencies. Again, state intervention into vigilante groups has made some vigilante groups uniformed and ranked agencies. The House of Representatives of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Bill (2017) Benue State Vigilante Group Law (2000) the Voice (2000). These sources collaborates the nature of state intervention into vigilante activities.

The study established that with state intervention into vigilante activities vigilante groups', vigilantes are not on monthly salary yet. In irregular instances, vigilantes receive stipends and honourarium of (10,000 naira) from the state government. Local vigilante groups offer free and voluntary security and safety services to the community till date. However, there are different sources from which vigilante activities are financed. Such sources include good will from individuals, case registration fees, and bail fees. The study established that state legal intervention into vigilante groups does not warrant sophisticated arm usage by vigilante groups. The weapons they (vigilante groups) use are light in nature. Given the risk involved in vigilante group's activities, vigilantes carry weapons for the purposes of self defense. However, there are no laws empowering vigilante groups to carry arms. By implication, vigilante groups are not expected to carry weapon. HRW (2004) corroborate the findings above. However, Livestock Guard officials in Benue state are noticed to be in possession of sophisticated weapons provided to them by the state.

With the intervention of the federal, state, and even local government into the activities of vigilante groups, there is in existence different types of vigilantes ranging Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) which claims to have federal government mandate, Benue State Community Voluntary Guard (BSCVG) established by the government of Benue state, and the local vigilante groups or Neighbourhood Watchers formed landlords, or the community.

Conclusion

The web of security provision in Nigeria is complex and multi-dimensional. At one level, agitations are in the process calling for the creation of state government driven policing institutions tasked with the mandate of maintaining security and enforcing law and order. This is the reason behind state intervention into vigilante groups' activities preparatory to the actualization of component state policing agency. Therefore, the sources of security in Nigeria exist outside formal state agencies. Whether in rural areas or in the inner cities of Nigeria, public security is beyond the legal authority of the formal policing agencies. In different contexts, groups of ordinary citizens (usually young men and retirees of formal agencies of policing) organize themselves along different structures, sometimes with formal permission from the authorities, identifying themselves as 'neighbourhood/community watch groups' or 'vigilante groups'.

Recommendations

Based on the foregoing, the study recommends the following as the practical and policy measures to be adopted towards strengthening vigilante groups and enhancing safety and security needs of the society:

- i. Provision of basic crime fighting equipment: effective policing would not be attained without the availability of the basic equipment needed by the operatives for operations. Therefore, vigilante groups should be provided with the needed equipment/apparatuses by the major stakeholders-host communities, non-governmental organizations, donor agencies, and philanthropist for enhanced performance.
- ii. Adequate funding of vigilante groups: funding is a major challenge of vigilante groups hampering its efficient operations. With adequate funding, vigilantes would have job security with corresponding rewards for excellence this would motivate vigilante performance thereby reducing tension and unnecessary anxiety among vigilantes. It will further reduce the degree of extortion among vigilantes. The funding of vigilante groups should be the responsibility of the host communities

- whose security and safety needs vigilantes provide. The Benue state government should facilitate the process of making vigilante groups a salaried agency.
- iii. Logistics should be made available for vigilante groups: the state and host communities of vigilante groups should provide it with the required logistics to overcome the logistics challenge bedeviling the organization. Such logistics include, torch lights, raincoats, batteries for torchlight, whistles, and patrol vans. The provision of the aforementioned logistics would enhance proper performance of vigilantes.
 - iv. Respects for the fundamental human rights of suspects: vigilante groups are constantly criticized by the public and human rights protection crusaders on the account of violation of human rights of suspects. In order to help remake the picture of vigilantism and human right abuses, it is also important to comprehend this phenomenon in relation to the formal state security agencies and human rights safeguard. Vigilante groups should not be law breakers or promoters of lawlessness and disorder in the society as it the case with Benue. Vigilante groups should synergy with Human Rights Watch Groups-National Human Rights Commission in Nigeria for enhanced training on the safeguard of the rights of the people in the course of their operations. In pursuance of the above, punitive sanctions should be imposed on erring vigilantes.
 - v. Proper and effective training of vigilante personnel: for any security agency to perform effectively and efficiently, its personnel must have underwent rigorous training in line with the global best practices of policing. Therefore, vigilantes should and must be properly trained in order to meet the professional standard and also to serve under a democratic setting effectively. Vigilante and the formal policing agencies should synergize for training on the essentials of policing in a democratic environment.
 - vi. Enactment of laws recognizing vigilante groups role in the society: one of the major constraints vigilante groups suffers is the absences or non-availability of enabling laws empowering, and defining the functions of vigilante groups. This has earned vigilante groups public criticisms thereby denying it of public support. The National Assembly's and Benue State House of Assembly's proposed vigilante laws are not approved by the appropriate authorities. They should be public outcry for the executive approval of legal provision recognizing and empowering the operations of vigilante groups. This process should be initiated by non-governmental organizations, civil society groups and the public whose security is threatened.
 - vii. Corruption charges leveled against vigilante groups should be checkmated: vigilante groups are surrounded with issues bordering on official corruption ranging from bribe taking and perversion of justice directed against perceived enemies of vigilantes. There is every need for vigilante groups to operate in the community with integrity and honour. The community as major stakeholder in vigilante and state anti-graft agencies should ensure that the endemic corruption in vigilante groups is checkmated.

References

- Abrahamsen, R., & Williams, M. (2005). *The globalization of private security: Country Report: Nigeria*. Dept of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth.
- Akinyele, R.T (2008). *Informal Policing in Lagos. A case study of Oshodi/Mafoluku, Lagos*. Lagos Centre for African Regional Integration and Border Studies (CARIBS), University of Lagos; pp: 156-173.
- Alemika, E.E.O., & Chukwuma, I.C. (2000). *Criminal victimization and fear of crime in Lagos Metropolis*, Nigeria, Lagos, Nigeria: CLEEN Foundation.
- Amnesty International (2002). *Nigeria: Vigilante Violence in the South and South-east*, AI Index: AFR 44/014/2002.
- Baker, B. (2002). *Living with Non- State Policing in South Africa: The Issues and Delemmas*. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40(1): 29-44.
- Bonger, W. (1916). *Criminality and Economic Conditions*. London: London University Press

- Bruce, D. and Komane, J. 1999. Taxis, cops and vigilantes: police attitudes towards street justice. *Crime and Conflict*, 17: 39-44.
- Dahrendorf, R. (1959). *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
- Ekeh, P.P. (2002). A Review of HRW's and CLEEN's Report "*The Bakassi Boys. The Legitimation of murder and torture*". On Statesponsoredvigilantegroups in Nigeria. www.waado.org/nigerdelta/Documents/ConstitutionalMatter/PoliceVigilante/ReviewBakassiBoys-Ekeh.html, (29.3:2007).
- Haralambos, M. & Holborn, M. (2000). *Sociology and Perspective* London. Collins Educational.
- Harnischfeger, J. (2008). Balance of Terror Rival Militia and Vigilantes in Nigeria. *Afrikanistik Aegyptologie online*, <http://www.Afrikanistik-online.de/archiv/2019/7658>
- Haysom, N. (1986). Mabagala: The rise of right wing vigilantes in south African. Occasional paper 10, university of witwater sand, center for applied legal studies.
- Hayson, N. (1986). Mabagala: The Rise of Right Wing Vigilante in South Africa. Centre for Applied Legal Studies
- Human Rights Watch (2002). Nigeria: Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and Torture. HRW Report May, 14 <http://www.hrw.org/report/2002/nigeria2/nigeria0502.pdf>.
- Johnson, L. (1996). What is Vigilantism? *British Journal of Criminology*, 36(2): 220-36
- Johnston, L. 1996. What is vigilantism?. *The British Journal of Criminology*, 36(2), 220-236.
- Justice For All Group. (2012), *Voluntary Policing Guideline for Vigilante Groups*, <http://www.J4aigeria.org>.
- Kamane, J & Bruce, D. (1999). *Taxi Cops and Vigilantes: Police Attitudes Towards Street*.
- Karl, M. (1930). *Capital Vol.2*.(Eds). Eden and Cedar Paul. London: Everyman's Library.
- Knowland, D. (2014), '*Battles between Drug Cartels and Vigilante Groups destabilize Mexico*.' March 29, 2014, <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles>
- Last, M. (2008). The Search for Security in Muslim Northern Nigeria. *Africa*, 78(1): 41-63, doi: 10.3366/E00019720080000041.
- Marx, G. T. & Archer, D. (1999), '*Citizen Involvement in the Law Enforcement*
- Nigerian Watch (2014, November 20). Borno State governor promises to arm CivilianJointTaskForcetofightBokoHaram, Retrieved from <http://www.nigerianwatch.com/news/5832-borno-state-governor-promises-to-arm-civilian-joint-task-force-to-fight-boko-haram> (accessed 06 September 2015)
- Obot, W. (2003). Ensuring Peace by any Means Necessary: Politics, Agenda and *Modus Operandi* of the Bakassi Boys. In tuned Babawale (edt), *Urban Violence, Ethnic Militais and the challenge of Democractic Consolidation in Nigeria*.
- Ojuwku, E. C. S. (2011). *Discovering the Police*. Ibadan: Gold Press Ltd.
- Olaniyi, R. (2002). *Crime control, police and vigilante groups: Community action for security in Sabon Gari, Kano, 1953-2001*. IFRA Ibadan Newsletter, Vol. XI, N. 2.
- Premium Times (2013, October 28). Borno Govt. to train 5,000 'civilian JTF' by 2015, Retrieved from <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/147407-borno-govt-train-5000-civilian-jtf-2015.html> (accessed 06 September 2015)
- Reno, W. (2002). The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing State. *Development and Change*. 33(5): 837-58. 10.1111/1447-7660-1-00251
- Smith, D.J (2007). The Bakassi Boys: Vigilantism, Violence and Political Imagination in Nigeria; *Current Anthropology*, 19(3).
- The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary.
- Umeagbalasi, E. (2012). *Focus on Anambra State (1) security and crime under review*. Intersociety of Nigeria.
- Vold, G.B (1979). *Theoretical Criminology (2nd Ed.)* Prepared by Thomas J. Bernard. New York: Oxford University Press.